Tuesday, 30 April 2013
Epistemology & Metaphysics Mindmap
Yay! New topic mapped out and ready to write up... Damn, my life... (And not even in an existential way)
Sunday, 21 April 2013
Elitism & Weakness of Will/Akrasia
Cognitivism doesn’t claim that there is one clear answer to every problem and the belief that there is moral truth doesn’t necessarily mean that the truth is simple or easy.
Elitism: As I’ve already mentioned, Plato held that gaining knowledge of the Good was very difficult indeed – it requires a special sort of person and years of training to reorientate the mind. We can object that everyone has the capacity for moral knowledge even if it is transcendent (e.g. religious people might argue everyone has a conscience). However, if we could consider this “elitism” instead as “expertise”, we can draw parallels with other areas of knowledge.
Weakness of Will (Akrasia): According to most cognitivists, what is morally good is also good “all things considered”. Weakness of will occurs when someone who knows that all things considered, it is better to do x, nevertheless does y.
Socrates argued this is an illusion – weakness of will is impossible. He held that no one knowingly does what (they believe) is wrong. This view is still defended by both cognitivists and non-cognitivists. For example, non-cognitivist Hare, argues that moral judgements guide our decisions and actions – to say “I ought to do a” is to give oneself a command. But weakness of will does seem to occur. Most philosophers who deny its reality defend a version of the claim that the person doesn’t really believe that the right thing to do is x – e.g. they actually believe that the pleasure of doing y, outweighs what is good about x.
Aristotle thought weakness of will is possible and argued that virtue isn’t simply knowledge, but knowledge held in the right way, so as to have the right effect on one’s motivation. More recently, Donald Davidson argued that the weak-willed person doesn’t convert their judgement that x is best ‘all things considered’ into the judgement that x is best unconditionally. (He missed the point a bit).
These solutions all argue that weakness of will involves a failure of the person to judge that x is (really) best. A different approach argues that judgement, or reason, simply does not have a final say on our decisions – our emotions/desires, in an irrational way, can change what we do so that we do genuinely judge x to be best but still do y.
Elitism: As I’ve already mentioned, Plato held that gaining knowledge of the Good was very difficult indeed – it requires a special sort of person and years of training to reorientate the mind. We can object that everyone has the capacity for moral knowledge even if it is transcendent (e.g. religious people might argue everyone has a conscience). However, if we could consider this “elitism” instead as “expertise”, we can draw parallels with other areas of knowledge.
Weakness of Will (Akrasia): According to most cognitivists, what is morally good is also good “all things considered”. Weakness of will occurs when someone who knows that all things considered, it is better to do x, nevertheless does y.
Socrates argued this is an illusion – weakness of will is impossible. He held that no one knowingly does what (they believe) is wrong. This view is still defended by both cognitivists and non-cognitivists. For example, non-cognitivist Hare, argues that moral judgements guide our decisions and actions – to say “I ought to do a” is to give oneself a command. But weakness of will does seem to occur. Most philosophers who deny its reality defend a version of the claim that the person doesn’t really believe that the right thing to do is x – e.g. they actually believe that the pleasure of doing y, outweighs what is good about x.
Aristotle thought weakness of will is possible and argued that virtue isn’t simply knowledge, but knowledge held in the right way, so as to have the right effect on one’s motivation. More recently, Donald Davidson argued that the weak-willed person doesn’t convert their judgement that x is best ‘all things considered’ into the judgement that x is best unconditionally. (He missed the point a bit).
These solutions all argue that weakness of will involves a failure of the person to judge that x is (really) best. A different approach argues that judgement, or reason, simply does not have a final say on our decisions – our emotions/desires, in an irrational way, can change what we do so that we do genuinely judge x to be best but still do y.
Saturday, 20 April 2013
How is knowledge of "moral truth" possible?
All the forms of cognitivism we have discussed argue that moral knowledge is gained through reasoning, and involves a type of rational insight. In this way, moral knowledge is different from empirical knowledge. This is one important “disanalogy” with secondary qualities. Both Plato and Aristotle argue that it involves training one’s desires and emotions first, because if we don’t develop virtues, we won’t be able to see the truth; Aristotle adds that it cannot be taught, but requires experience of life. Contemporary philosophers offer two types of model (of this “insight/reasoning”):
Self-evidence: The difficulty with ‘self-evident’ judgements is that people disagree about whether they are true or not. Moore thought it was self-evident that pleasure is good and that maximising the good is right. But other philosophers have thought it was self-evident that there are times when it is wrong to maximise pleasure.
Reflective Equilibrium: this claims that no judgment is self-evident, because it rests on support by other beliefs. When we then question those beliefs, we can give reasons for believing them, but must in turn assume others. Our reasoning, then, involves a matter of interpreting, applying and adjusting a framework of reasons. We test our claims and the reasons we give by their place in the framework.
Non-cognitivists will reply that our intuitions are not insights into moral truth at all. Instead, they reflect our pre-existing values and commitments. In addition to the arguments of Emotivism and Prescriptivism, a third argument is developed by Nietzsche, who argues that our approach to moral philosophy, and philosophy in general, is all wrong. He argues that ‘only that which has no history is definable’ in this way. (On the Genealogy of Morals, II §13) Our ideas have a history, so trying to give universal definitions of them is radically mistaken. In fact, the intuitions we use to defend this or that answer are themselves as historical, as contentious as the theories we give – so they offer no real support:
“…most of a philosopher’s conscious thinking is secretly guided and channelled into particular tracks by his instincts. Behind all logic, too, and its apparent tyranny of movement there are value judgements, or to speak more clearly, physiological demands for the preservation of a particular kind of life…” (Beyond Good and Evil, §3)
Nietzsche holds that different people are ‘instinctively’ drawn to different kinds of life. Our values are a reflection of the type of person we are. Everybody is drawn to the way of life that suits them best.
Agreement over Moral Truth: Value judgements go beyond the facts. Hume argues the moral judgment doesn’t pick out a fact, it expresses a feeling, which is why you can’t reach moral agreement just by discussing the facts. The cognitivist can reply that this oversimplifies moral arguments. If two people agree on the natural facts, but still disagree morally, then they must be disagreeing about reasons.
Firstly we can object that it is not plausible that all cases of moral disagreement involve at least one person who lacks virtue and life experience. Second, if we press this line too much, then we return to Plato’s view that moral truth is very hard to come to know. And if only a few people can gain moral knowledge, then the possibility of agreement on moral truth is very small indeed. Third, there are many influences on people’s moral beliefs, not just reasoning and insight.
The Extent to which Moral Truth can motivate/justify: If there are moral truths, then it is uncontentious that they justify actions. So we shall concentrate on the more difficult question of whether moral truths motivate action.
Hume argued that in order to act, we need beliefs, about how the world is and how to change it, and a desire, in order to be motivated to change it. But surely statements about right and wrong, good and bad are motivating in their own right. But in that case, they are not like beliefs (about truths), they are like desires. However, moral judgements are only motivating to people who care about morality. If we argue instead, that moral truths are based on relational properties, we can explain how they are motivating. If moral judgments are about what we have reason to do, they will be motivating, because judgments about reasons are judgments about reasons for us. As long as we are rational, reasons will motivate us directly.
Self-evidence: The difficulty with ‘self-evident’ judgements is that people disagree about whether they are true or not. Moore thought it was self-evident that pleasure is good and that maximising the good is right. But other philosophers have thought it was self-evident that there are times when it is wrong to maximise pleasure.
Reflective Equilibrium: this claims that no judgment is self-evident, because it rests on support by other beliefs. When we then question those beliefs, we can give reasons for believing them, but must in turn assume others. Our reasoning, then, involves a matter of interpreting, applying and adjusting a framework of reasons. We test our claims and the reasons we give by their place in the framework.
Non-cognitivists will reply that our intuitions are not insights into moral truth at all. Instead, they reflect our pre-existing values and commitments. In addition to the arguments of Emotivism and Prescriptivism, a third argument is developed by Nietzsche, who argues that our approach to moral philosophy, and philosophy in general, is all wrong. He argues that ‘only that which has no history is definable’ in this way. (On the Genealogy of Morals, II §13) Our ideas have a history, so trying to give universal definitions of them is radically mistaken. In fact, the intuitions we use to defend this or that answer are themselves as historical, as contentious as the theories we give – so they offer no real support:
“…most of a philosopher’s conscious thinking is secretly guided and channelled into particular tracks by his instincts. Behind all logic, too, and its apparent tyranny of movement there are value judgements, or to speak more clearly, physiological demands for the preservation of a particular kind of life…” (Beyond Good and Evil, §3)
Nietzsche holds that different people are ‘instinctively’ drawn to different kinds of life. Our values are a reflection of the type of person we are. Everybody is drawn to the way of life that suits them best.
Agreement over Moral Truth: Value judgements go beyond the facts. Hume argues the moral judgment doesn’t pick out a fact, it expresses a feeling, which is why you can’t reach moral agreement just by discussing the facts. The cognitivist can reply that this oversimplifies moral arguments. If two people agree on the natural facts, but still disagree morally, then they must be disagreeing about reasons.
Firstly we can object that it is not plausible that all cases of moral disagreement involve at least one person who lacks virtue and life experience. Second, if we press this line too much, then we return to Plato’s view that moral truth is very hard to come to know. And if only a few people can gain moral knowledge, then the possibility of agreement on moral truth is very small indeed. Third, there are many influences on people’s moral beliefs, not just reasoning and insight.
The Extent to which Moral Truth can motivate/justify: If there are moral truths, then it is uncontentious that they justify actions. So we shall concentrate on the more difficult question of whether moral truths motivate action.
Hume argued that in order to act, we need beliefs, about how the world is and how to change it, and a desire, in order to be motivated to change it. But surely statements about right and wrong, good and bad are motivating in their own right. But in that case, they are not like beliefs (about truths), they are like desires. However, moral judgements are only motivating to people who care about morality. If we argue instead, that moral truths are based on relational properties, we can explain how they are motivating. If moral judgments are about what we have reason to do, they will be motivating, because judgments about reasons are judgments about reasons for us. As long as we are rational, reasons will motivate us directly.
Friday, 19 April 2013
Objective Moral Truth & Relational Properties
Reasons for Action: The “Is-Ought” gap makes it seem ridiculous to appeal to fact when we are trying to make a moral judgement. However, we generally think of facts as reasons that support our moral claims (e.g. “eating meat is wrong” supported by “the suffering it causes to animals”). The idea of a ‘reason’ only makes sense in relation to a rational agent.
Understanding moral properties as reasons for action can be used in arguing for objective moral truth. Compare reasons for other types of belief: If radiometric decay indicates that the dinosaur bones are 65 million years old, this is a reason (though not proof) to believe that dinosaurs lived on Earth 65 million years ago. We can now understand moral judgments like this: to say that something is wrong is to say that the moral reasons against doing it are stronger than any moral reason in favour of doing it. Because this is a statement of (normative) fact, then moral judgments can be true or false.
This theory explains the connection between natural properties and moral judgments and so bridges Hume’s ‘is-ought’ objection. We cannot deduce moral judgments from considering the natural facts; instead, we must weigh up the reasons that the natural facts give us. But once we recognise that whether a natural fact counts as a reason for believing a certain value judgement is itself a matter of objective fact, we can cross the gap.
Objections: We can object that if reasons are related to us, dependent on us, then surely they must be subjective. Facts are part of the world. The fact the dinosaurs roamed the Earth millions of years ago would be true whether anyone had found out about it or not. But whether something is a reason or not depends on us.
This misunderstands the way in which reasons depend on us. There are lots of facts – for example, facts about being in love, or facts about music – that ‘depend’ on human beings and their activities (there would be no love if no one loved anything). But they are still facts, because they are independent of our judgements, and made true by the way the world, in this case the human world, is. You can make mistakes about whether someone is in love or whether a piece of music is baroque or classical.
But are reasons dependent on ‘human beings’ in general or on individuals? Take the case of animal suffering: surely this is only a reason for me not to eat meat if I care about animals. So what we (individually) have reason to do depends on what we (individually) want. So reasons aren’t objective, they are subjective. Moral judgments are expressions of what we care about, they are not expressions of truth.
The Analogy With Secondary Qualities: Hume argued that moral judgment is analogous with the distinction of secondary qualities:
“...when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that... you have a feeling... of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar’d to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which... are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind.” (A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part 1, § 1)
Vice and virtue are not properties of actions and characters, and so moral judgments are not ‘true’ or ‘false’. Instead, moral judgments are expressions of our feelings (of approval and disapproval). McDowell disagrees, arguing that secondary qualities are properties of the object that enable it to cause certain experiences in us. When we perceive the colour of an object, we still perceive the object, but as it appears to us. If secondary qualities can be understood objectively, then we can use the analogy with secondary qualities to defend the view that there is moral truth. We can link moral values and reasons: a value gives us a reason to act in a particular way. So McDowell is arguing that whether some fact (e.g. animal suffering) is a reason to act in a certain way (e.g. stop eating meat) depends in general on human responses; but it is independent of any individual’s response, so it is not subjective.
Understanding moral properties as reasons for action can be used in arguing for objective moral truth. Compare reasons for other types of belief: If radiometric decay indicates that the dinosaur bones are 65 million years old, this is a reason (though not proof) to believe that dinosaurs lived on Earth 65 million years ago. We can now understand moral judgments like this: to say that something is wrong is to say that the moral reasons against doing it are stronger than any moral reason in favour of doing it. Because this is a statement of (normative) fact, then moral judgments can be true or false.
This theory explains the connection between natural properties and moral judgments and so bridges Hume’s ‘is-ought’ objection. We cannot deduce moral judgments from considering the natural facts; instead, we must weigh up the reasons that the natural facts give us. But once we recognise that whether a natural fact counts as a reason for believing a certain value judgement is itself a matter of objective fact, we can cross the gap.
Objections: We can object that if reasons are related to us, dependent on us, then surely they must be subjective. Facts are part of the world. The fact the dinosaurs roamed the Earth millions of years ago would be true whether anyone had found out about it or not. But whether something is a reason or not depends on us.
This misunderstands the way in which reasons depend on us. There are lots of facts – for example, facts about being in love, or facts about music – that ‘depend’ on human beings and their activities (there would be no love if no one loved anything). But they are still facts, because they are independent of our judgements, and made true by the way the world, in this case the human world, is. You can make mistakes about whether someone is in love or whether a piece of music is baroque or classical.
But are reasons dependent on ‘human beings’ in general or on individuals? Take the case of animal suffering: surely this is only a reason for me not to eat meat if I care about animals. So what we (individually) have reason to do depends on what we (individually) want. So reasons aren’t objective, they are subjective. Moral judgments are expressions of what we care about, they are not expressions of truth.
The Analogy With Secondary Qualities: Hume argued that moral judgment is analogous with the distinction of secondary qualities:
“...when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that... you have a feeling... of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar’d to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which... are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind.” (A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part 1, § 1)
Vice and virtue are not properties of actions and characters, and so moral judgments are not ‘true’ or ‘false’. Instead, moral judgments are expressions of our feelings (of approval and disapproval). McDowell disagrees, arguing that secondary qualities are properties of the object that enable it to cause certain experiences in us. When we perceive the colour of an object, we still perceive the object, but as it appears to us. If secondary qualities can be understood objectively, then we can use the analogy with secondary qualities to defend the view that there is moral truth. We can link moral values and reasons: a value gives us a reason to act in a particular way. So McDowell is arguing that whether some fact (e.g. animal suffering) is a reason to act in a certain way (e.g. stop eating meat) depends in general on human responses; but it is independent of any individual’s response, so it is not subjective.
Wednesday, 17 April 2013
Moral Cognitivism
Cognitivism is the view that we can have moral knowledge. The cognitivist believes that statements like “euthanasia is not wrong” are expressions of beliefs, which can be true or false. Conversely, non-cognitivists argue that there is no moral knowledge, because there is no objective moral truth.
The cognitivist argues that our experience of morality suggests that there are moral truths because we make “mistakes” (children have to be taught right and wrong); because morality feels like a demand from ‘outside’ us; and because many people believe in moral progress (how would this be possible unless some views about morality are better than others?). If there are moral truths, they must be quite different from empirical truths…
Moral Truth as Transcendent:
This is the idea that values are not part of the empirical world, but exist beyond it, and it springs from the observation that we commonly experience a conflict between what we label ‘right’ and what we want to do or how we feel.
The most common way of understanding this is through a belief in God, the origin of the ‘higher’ part of ourselves and our ‘souls’, perhaps. However, there are other interpretations of moral transcendence that are independent of faith in a supernatural being. For instance, we may consider moral truths as being abstract like mathematical truths, which aren’t just concepts – 2+2=4 was true even before we came up with the concepts of ‘2’ and ‘4’. We make mathematical discoveries when we use intuition/our capacity of reason. So if moral truths were objective in the same way, existing independently of us, could we discover them using some form of rational intuition? Some philosophers identify this as “conscience”, which they posit is of course fallible but can be trained to become more accurate.
Plato’s theory of the Forms provides another example of this understanding of values. He suggests there are Forms that relate to moral values – justice, courage, kindness et cetera – which are immutable and exist outside space and time. Plato terms the ‘supreme’ Form, the Form of ‘Good’ and so knowing what is good is the highest kind of knowledge.
Moral Truth as Based on Natural Facts:
Opposing the view that moral truths are transcendent, this idea proposes that moral truths are tied closely to psychological facts, and has many proponents who we will now evaluate in detail:
Virtue Ethics: Aristotle argued that moral philosophy is interested in the ‘good life’ for human beings as the particular sorts of being we are. We work to attain “εὐδαιμονία” – human flourishing; the “final cause” of mankind. This works the same with objects – the most excellent knife is the one which best fulfils what it is to be a knife, i.e. is sharpest. He saw that there were different accounts of what the key virtues were (i.e. what is the best way for a human to be) and sought to give an objective account; a good life is one lived in harmony and co-operation with other people – it is in the nature and best interests of humans to be social.
Utilitarianism: Mill claims that an action is right if it creates greater (or equal) happiness than any other action in that situation. So ‘right’ = ‘greatest happiness’, and ‘good’ = ‘happiness’. He says that ‘questions about ends are...questions about what things are desirable’. (“Utilitarianism”, Ch. 4) And our evidence about what is desirable must come from what we desire. Many philosophers object that Mill has simply failed to spot the gap between the two meanings of ‘desirable’ (Its usual meaning of ‘worthy of being desired’ and another meaning being ‘capable of being desired’). But this is unlikely. Instead, Mill is asking ‘What evidence is there for thinking that something is worthy of being desired?’. He argues that people in general desire happiness. Unless we think that people in general all desire what is not worth desiring, this looks like good evidence.
In “Principia Ethica”, G.E. Moore objected to Mill’s view above, arguing that moral properties are, in some way, based on natural properties; but are not identical. He called the attempt to equate goodness to any natural property the “naturalistic fallacy”, claiming that ‘goodness’ cannot be defined in terms of anything else and drawing an analogy with colour. Blue is a simple property, and no one can explain what blue is, you have to see it for yourself to understand what blue is. But unlike colours, goodness is a non-natural property. It is not part of the natural world, the world of science; but it is part of reality.
His argument is an ‘open question argument’. If goodness is just happiness, then it wouldn’t make sense to ask, “Is it good to make people happy?”. “Is x good?” is always a real question while “Is x x?” is not, so goodness cannot be any other property.
However, if Mill had been around to read Moore’s criticism of his argument (unfortunately he dies the year Moore was born!), he would have no doubt promptly set him straight. For Moore has confused concepts and properties. Consider the following similar argument:
“The property of being water cannot be any property in the world, such as the property of being H2O. If it was then the question “Is water H2O?” would not make sense – it would be like asking “Is H2O H2O?”. So water is a simple, unanalysable property.”
This is not right, as water just is H2O. Two different concepts – ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ – can pick out the same property in the world. You knew about water before you knew it was H2O – during this time, you had the concept ‘water’, but not the concept ‘H2O’. So they are different concepts, but they both refer to the same thing. Likewise, the concept ‘goodness’ is a different concept from ‘happiness’, but perhaps they are exactly the same property in the world.
The “Is-Ought” Gap: We may think that Moore is right to think that, from any natural property, we cannot deduce a moral property. Whatever facts you get together to support your moral judgment (the action will cause happiness), you cannot logically infer the judgment (it is morally right). Hume noted the gap between describing the facts and saying something ought to be done: ‘this ought...expresses some new relation [of which it] seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it’. (Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part 1, §1)
The cognitivist argues that our experience of morality suggests that there are moral truths because we make “mistakes” (children have to be taught right and wrong); because morality feels like a demand from ‘outside’ us; and because many people believe in moral progress (how would this be possible unless some views about morality are better than others?). If there are moral truths, they must be quite different from empirical truths…
Moral Truth as Transcendent:
This is the idea that values are not part of the empirical world, but exist beyond it, and it springs from the observation that we commonly experience a conflict between what we label ‘right’ and what we want to do or how we feel.
The most common way of understanding this is through a belief in God, the origin of the ‘higher’ part of ourselves and our ‘souls’, perhaps. However, there are other interpretations of moral transcendence that are independent of faith in a supernatural being. For instance, we may consider moral truths as being abstract like mathematical truths, which aren’t just concepts – 2+2=4 was true even before we came up with the concepts of ‘2’ and ‘4’. We make mathematical discoveries when we use intuition/our capacity of reason. So if moral truths were objective in the same way, existing independently of us, could we discover them using some form of rational intuition? Some philosophers identify this as “conscience”, which they posit is of course fallible but can be trained to become more accurate.
Plato’s theory of the Forms provides another example of this understanding of values. He suggests there are Forms that relate to moral values – justice, courage, kindness et cetera – which are immutable and exist outside space and time. Plato terms the ‘supreme’ Form, the Form of ‘Good’ and so knowing what is good is the highest kind of knowledge.
Moral Truth as Based on Natural Facts:
Opposing the view that moral truths are transcendent, this idea proposes that moral truths are tied closely to psychological facts, and has many proponents who we will now evaluate in detail:
Virtue Ethics: Aristotle argued that moral philosophy is interested in the ‘good life’ for human beings as the particular sorts of being we are. We work to attain “εὐδαιμονία” – human flourishing; the “final cause” of mankind. This works the same with objects – the most excellent knife is the one which best fulfils what it is to be a knife, i.e. is sharpest. He saw that there were different accounts of what the key virtues were (i.e. what is the best way for a human to be) and sought to give an objective account; a good life is one lived in harmony and co-operation with other people – it is in the nature and best interests of humans to be social.
Utilitarianism: Mill claims that an action is right if it creates greater (or equal) happiness than any other action in that situation. So ‘right’ = ‘greatest happiness’, and ‘good’ = ‘happiness’. He says that ‘questions about ends are...questions about what things are desirable’. (“Utilitarianism”, Ch. 4) And our evidence about what is desirable must come from what we desire. Many philosophers object that Mill has simply failed to spot the gap between the two meanings of ‘desirable’ (Its usual meaning of ‘worthy of being desired’ and another meaning being ‘capable of being desired’). But this is unlikely. Instead, Mill is asking ‘What evidence is there for thinking that something is worthy of being desired?’. He argues that people in general desire happiness. Unless we think that people in general all desire what is not worth desiring, this looks like good evidence.
In “Principia Ethica”, G.E. Moore objected to Mill’s view above, arguing that moral properties are, in some way, based on natural properties; but are not identical. He called the attempt to equate goodness to any natural property the “naturalistic fallacy”, claiming that ‘goodness’ cannot be defined in terms of anything else and drawing an analogy with colour. Blue is a simple property, and no one can explain what blue is, you have to see it for yourself to understand what blue is. But unlike colours, goodness is a non-natural property. It is not part of the natural world, the world of science; but it is part of reality.
His argument is an ‘open question argument’. If goodness is just happiness, then it wouldn’t make sense to ask, “Is it good to make people happy?”. “Is x good?” is always a real question while “Is x x?” is not, so goodness cannot be any other property.
However, if Mill had been around to read Moore’s criticism of his argument (unfortunately he dies the year Moore was born!), he would have no doubt promptly set him straight. For Moore has confused concepts and properties. Consider the following similar argument:
“The property of being water cannot be any property in the world, such as the property of being H2O. If it was then the question “Is water H2O?” would not make sense – it would be like asking “Is H2O H2O?”. So water is a simple, unanalysable property.”
This is not right, as water just is H2O. Two different concepts – ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ – can pick out the same property in the world. You knew about water before you knew it was H2O – during this time, you had the concept ‘water’, but not the concept ‘H2O’. So they are different concepts, but they both refer to the same thing. Likewise, the concept ‘goodness’ is a different concept from ‘happiness’, but perhaps they are exactly the same property in the world.
The “Is-Ought” Gap: We may think that Moore is right to think that, from any natural property, we cannot deduce a moral property. Whatever facts you get together to support your moral judgment (the action will cause happiness), you cannot logically infer the judgment (it is morally right). Hume noted the gap between describing the facts and saying something ought to be done: ‘this ought...expresses some new relation [of which it] seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it’. (Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part 1, §1)
Tuesday, 16 April 2013
Moral Philosophy Mindmap
Half a league, half a league,
Half a league onward,
All in the valley of Death...
Half a league onward,
All in the valley of Death...
Sunday, 14 April 2013
Balance
This short film by photographer and director Tobias Hutzler, shows Rigolo Swiss Nouveau Cirque artist Maedir Eugster, performing an unbelievable balancing act. In deep concentration the artist carefully assembles 16 bare ribs of palm leaves and a feather by balancing each piece in front of the other.
Wednesday, 10 April 2013
Lake Street Dive: You Go Down Smooth Lyrics
Addicted to Lake Street Dive! I literally can't say enough great things about them: Rachael Price has to be one of the best jazz vocalists out there at the moment! Anyway I couldn't find the lyrics anywhere so here you are:
Would it be true to say that I ordered you
Or is it you that ordered me?
I could say you are the only one I see
But I can't stop at two or three...
And I am afraid to need you so
And I am to sober not to know
That you may be my problem, not my love...
Would I be lying if I said you were too sweet
Though I'm quite sure you've got a bite
I could say that you were just a special treat
Though we both know that's not right...
And I am afraid to need you so
And I am to sober not to know
That you may be my problem, not my love...
Cause you go down smooth....
Would it be true to say you go to my head
Or is that sentiment too frank
I could say you make it sweet to go to bed
But then it's you that breaks the bank...
And I am afraid to need you so
And I am to sober not to know
That you may be my problem, not my love...
Cause you go down smooth....
Would it be true to say that I ordered you
Or is it you that ordered me?
I could say you are the only one I see
But I can't stop at two or three...
And I am afraid to need you so
And I am to sober not to know
That you may be my problem, not my love...
Would I be lying if I said you were too sweet
Though I'm quite sure you've got a bite
I could say that you were just a special treat
Though we both know that's not right...
And I am afraid to need you so
And I am to sober not to know
That you may be my problem, not my love...
Cause you go down smooth....
Would it be true to say you go to my head
Or is that sentiment too frank
I could say you make it sweet to go to bed
But then it's you that breaks the bank...
And I am afraid to need you so
And I am to sober not to know
That you may be my problem, not my love...
Cause you go down smooth....
Tennessee Breakdown Sheet Music (Fiddle Tune)
A friend posted this tune on my Facebook and I liked it enough to write it down. Enjoy x
Monday, 8 April 2013
Tuesday, 2 April 2013
Throw It Away: A Song By Abbey Lincoln
Celebrating the fact that I've just acquired a double bass, here's a song by Abbey Lincoln:
Tuesday, 19 March 2013
Sugar in the Gourd (Fiddle Tune)
Below you'll find a transcription of a fiddle tune called Sugar in the Gourd. You'll also find a video of Ben Paley (whose version I transcribed) playing it with Tab Hunter - both phenomenal.
P.S. I'll try to learn and transcribe the other tune they play afterwards sometime soon. ("Texas" – a tune by Henry Reed I think?)
P.S. I'll try to learn and transcribe the other tune they play afterwards sometime soon. ("Texas" – a tune by Henry Reed I think?)
Sunday, 10 March 2013
Honest Titles
Here follows a collection of book-covers. Those of a few of Shakespeare's plays, but with a twist – they have be honestly retitled. Enjoy ;)
And my personal favourite:
Saturday, 9 March 2013
The Emerging Art of Contentment
This article is for all those who are miserable and depressed; for all those who occasionally get those days where it feels as though the whole world is against them; and above all for those who are easily frustrated on a daily basis by the stupidity of your fellow man.
There is an art to finding contentment in one's life and it comes most easily when one realises that every statement, action and reaction of another human being is the sum result of their total life experience to date. In other words, the majority of people in our world say and do what they do from their own set of fears, conclusions, defenses and attempts to survive. Most of it, even when aimed directly at us, has nothing to do with us. Usually, it has more to do with all the other times, and in particular the first few times, that this person experienced a similar situation, usually when they were young.[1]
If you wish to take this a step further, you will quickly reach the view that free will is an illusion. This position is controversial for the layperson, but is fast becoming the accepted opinion among neuroscientists, philosophers and other academics. This does not damn us to some sort of pre-determined existence in which we should all sit back and just watch our lives play out. However, it does mean that emotions like pride and blame become irrational. For example, if a man shoulders past you in the street, you automatically assume that he had the choice to act differently. Consider that this most recent deed is the most recent effect in a causal chain stretching back beyond his birth, and you have no more reason to "blame" him than you would if a dog bit your foot or a baby punched you in the face (common occurrences on the streets of London I assure you). You may have a knee-jerk reaction but you're not going to want to kill the baby/dog if don't assign it free will.
The only rational thing to do is to try to help the bloke: find out why he is such an angry arse and try to change that. Or just get on with your life and think nothing more of it.
If we scale that up a bit and say he punched your whole family to death, hating him is still irrational (however natural) – would you hate a tornado or a baby in the same sense? Again, the only rational actions are to protect society by locking him up while rehabilitating him.
For the same reason, it becomes impossible for you to take credit for your achievements and talents, since they are just produced by your path through the causal nexus – they are the outcome of everything that you've been exposed to, and if you're reading this then you can start feeling very lucky right now...
P.S. Stay away from babies – the laws of causality and randomness do not apply to them.
[1] The Art of Not Being Offended – Dr. Jodi Prinzivalli (don't bother reading this, it's some mystic mumbo-jumbo – or energetic psychology/emotional alchemy – which weaves fact and fantasy in a not-even-vaguely-amusing way.)
There is an art to finding contentment in one's life and it comes most easily when one realises that every statement, action and reaction of another human being is the sum result of their total life experience to date. In other words, the majority of people in our world say and do what they do from their own set of fears, conclusions, defenses and attempts to survive. Most of it, even when aimed directly at us, has nothing to do with us. Usually, it has more to do with all the other times, and in particular the first few times, that this person experienced a similar situation, usually when they were young.[1]
If you wish to take this a step further, you will quickly reach the view that free will is an illusion. This position is controversial for the layperson, but is fast becoming the accepted opinion among neuroscientists, philosophers and other academics. This does not damn us to some sort of pre-determined existence in which we should all sit back and just watch our lives play out. However, it does mean that emotions like pride and blame become irrational. For example, if a man shoulders past you in the street, you automatically assume that he had the choice to act differently. Consider that this most recent deed is the most recent effect in a causal chain stretching back beyond his birth, and you have no more reason to "blame" him than you would if a dog bit your foot or a baby punched you in the face (common occurrences on the streets of London I assure you). You may have a knee-jerk reaction but you're not going to want to kill the baby/dog if don't assign it free will.
The only rational thing to do is to try to help the bloke: find out why he is such an angry arse and try to change that. Or just get on with your life and think nothing more of it.
If we scale that up a bit and say he punched your whole family to death, hating him is still irrational (however natural) – would you hate a tornado or a baby in the same sense? Again, the only rational actions are to protect society by locking him up while rehabilitating him.
For the same reason, it becomes impossible for you to take credit for your achievements and talents, since they are just produced by your path through the causal nexus – they are the outcome of everything that you've been exposed to, and if you're reading this then you can start feeling very lucky right now...
P.S. Stay away from babies – the laws of causality and randomness do not apply to them.
[1] The Art of Not Being Offended – Dr. Jodi Prinzivalli (don't bother reading this, it's some mystic mumbo-jumbo – or energetic psychology/emotional alchemy – which weaves fact and fantasy in a not-even-vaguely-amusing way.)
Friday, 8 March 2013
Yew Piney Mountain
Below you'll find a transcription of an Appalachian fiddle tune called Yew Piney Mountain. You'll also find a video of Ben Paley (whose version I transcribed) playing it at the Lewes Folk Club.
Thursday, 28 February 2013
Duolingo: "The Best Thing on the Web"
Hailed as "the best thing on the internet", Duolingo is a language-learning service which is totally free and incredibly well-designed. Having used it for a few months, I can vouch that it's better than most paid courses out there like Rosetta Stone, and has really made it easy for me to motivate my learning with stats on my progress and a course that designs itself based on my strengths and weaknesses. But the best is yet to come...
When you are asked to translate a passage, at any level, you are helping translate real-world information and articles! So while you learn a new language, you are unknowingly part of a crowd-sourced attempt to translate the internet! The most clever thing about this are the statistical algorithms used in averaging out the most accurate translation (obviously when you are a lower level learner, you will translate more passages inaccurately). Anyway, the point is, is that I heartily recommend learning one or more new language(s) starting today, and using this fantastic site. Bloody awesome.
When you are asked to translate a passage, at any level, you are helping translate real-world information and articles! So while you learn a new language, you are unknowingly part of a crowd-sourced attempt to translate the internet! The most clever thing about this are the statistical algorithms used in averaging out the most accurate translation (obviously when you are a lower level learner, you will translate more passages inaccurately). Anyway, the point is, is that I heartily recommend learning one or more new language(s) starting today, and using this fantastic site. Bloody awesome.
Saturday, 23 February 2013
Secret Society Behind Pope's Resignation?
Recently, an article circulated major UK news sites and blogs written by a journalist claiming to have inside information on the resignation of Pope Benedict XVI that may link the Pope's decision to step down with the sex abuse scandal that plagues the Catholic Church. He claimed that an arrest warrant has been issued for the Pope, whose given name is Joseph Ratzinger. The pontiff allegedly has an upcoming meeting with Italian President Giorgio Napolitano in which he will seek immunity for links to sex crimes against children.
The rumoured warrant was issued by an unknown country in Europe that seeks to prosecute Pope Benedict XVI. (http://www.addictinginfo.org/2013/02/14/pope-allegedly-sought-immunity-for-abuse-crimes-just-before-resigning/) Apparently, the source of the information came from the International Tribunal website that calls the Pope a "war criminal." However, this journalist (who seems to be the source of the other articles cited) claims that an organisation, known to him only as “The Orpheus Society”, were the driving force behind the warrant. This shadowy group has seldom reached the press, and when news of their exploits is published, it is only ever available for a brief time. Our journalist likens them to the Masons; “...a society with a long and rich history which has kept itself to itself…”, but adds that “…[the society] are not religious, spiritual, or indeed doctrinal, in any way.” Supposedly bearing many of England’s finest thinkers among its ranks, the group was purportedly founded sometime during the 17th Century by Samuel Hartlib, around the same time as the Royal Society was created. Now connected to a college of the arts and humanities based in London (Orpheus College), the society sponsors scientific endeavours worldwide and enjoys hosting A.C. Grayling as a regular guest speaker. It’s not difficult to see why this forward-thinking institution may consider Ratzinger’s crimes relevant, especially to his position as leader of a global religious power.
It seems in addition to the pressure from the Orpheus Society and attempts by this European government to prosecute, a New York based organisation, "The Centre for Constitutional Rights", has accused the Pope and his Cardinals of possible crimes against humanity for sheltering pedophile priests. The non-profit legal group has requested an ICC inquiry on behalf of the Survivor’s Network, citing the church’s “long-standing and pervasive system of sexual violence.” The Vatican has refused to comment.
Here are a few links to the article claiming to have information about “The Orpheus Society” – I wouldn’t be surprised if all mention of them is removed pretty sharpish or if the links go dead. I’m just counting on the fact that my blog is relatively obscure. If you can repost the original article or this one on a site of your own – go for it!
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2066856.stm
http://secretsocietynews.com/orpheus-society-a-real-secret/nos1/
http://www.businessinsider.com/just-another-masonic-lodge-the-orpheus-club-2013-2
http://news.discovery.com/history/orpheus-exposed-20130208.htm
The rumoured warrant was issued by an unknown country in Europe that seeks to prosecute Pope Benedict XVI. (http://www.addictinginfo.org/2013/02/14/pope-allegedly-sought-immunity-for-abuse-crimes-just-before-resigning/) Apparently, the source of the information came from the International Tribunal website that calls the Pope a "war criminal." However, this journalist (who seems to be the source of the other articles cited) claims that an organisation, known to him only as “The Orpheus Society”, were the driving force behind the warrant. This shadowy group has seldom reached the press, and when news of their exploits is published, it is only ever available for a brief time. Our journalist likens them to the Masons; “...a society with a long and rich history which has kept itself to itself…”, but adds that “…[the society] are not religious, spiritual, or indeed doctrinal, in any way.” Supposedly bearing many of England’s finest thinkers among its ranks, the group was purportedly founded sometime during the 17th Century by Samuel Hartlib, around the same time as the Royal Society was created. Now connected to a college of the arts and humanities based in London (Orpheus College), the society sponsors scientific endeavours worldwide and enjoys hosting A.C. Grayling as a regular guest speaker. It’s not difficult to see why this forward-thinking institution may consider Ratzinger’s crimes relevant, especially to his position as leader of a global religious power.
It seems in addition to the pressure from the Orpheus Society and attempts by this European government to prosecute, a New York based organisation, "The Centre for Constitutional Rights", has accused the Pope and his Cardinals of possible crimes against humanity for sheltering pedophile priests. The non-profit legal group has requested an ICC inquiry on behalf of the Survivor’s Network, citing the church’s “long-standing and pervasive system of sexual violence.” The Vatican has refused to comment.
 |
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2066856.stm
http://secretsocietynews.com/orpheus-society-a-real-secret/nos1/
http://www.businessinsider.com/just-another-masonic-lodge-the-orpheus-club-2013-2
http://news.discovery.com/history/orpheus-exposed-20130208.htm
Friday, 15 February 2013
Retrograde (James Blake) Piano Cover
My cover of the new James Blake single I was going on about the other day. I wanted to work out some smooth piano chords – it doesn't work quite as well as the synths and I had to substitute a glissando for the detuning moment.
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| Totally covered the cover too... :D |
Wednesday, 13 February 2013
Swedish Polska
Basically what it says on the tin. A beautiful traditional Swedish polska played by a rather mediocre fiddler.
Sunday, 10 February 2013
New James Blake Tune: Retrograde
I wonder why it's called "Retrograde"? If you play it backwards do you think there might be a secret message?! I love this song more and more with every listen – it's that moment at 1:45 when it leaves G Aeolian and you get this stonking B♮throwing you into the realms of melodic minor harmony (into G Mixolydian♭13 for those of you who're interested! And then sneakily back to G Phrygian a little later). Simply marvellous with a good subwoofer and a rainy day!
Saturday, 9 February 2013
Ars Memoriae: Memory Palaces, Brain Attics & Sherlock Holmes
Today, we are guilty. Western society is rapidly losing the ability to remember. The reasons are many but our loss of such an important faculty is mainly due to the accessibility of information - everything you could possibly ever want to retain is available at swipe of a smartphone. But that's not true is it? You still have to remember your appointments, your shopping list, perhaps names of people you have just met at a dinner party... Your smartphone may even serve you there with calendar alerts, notes and quick-searches of Facebook. In which case, your memory may be so useless that, if you don't write yourself a reminder, you're guaranteed to forget to pick up the kids.
The art of memory is a lost one, and one in dire need of a revival. Secret societies like KL7 (oops - just gave that one away!) treat it as a sub rosa skill of which they are the protectors. In truth, we all have the potential (a ~10TB human brain - sorry if you're not) to remember vast quantities of information. All we need is a bit of practice - methods to make accurate memory a habit... and luckily there are a veritable plethora of them! Usually associated with training in logic and rhetoric, mnemotechnics have been around since the first millennium BCE, with early texts by authors such as Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. However, the one text from which we have gleaned the most is Rhetorica ad Herrenium (here credited to Cicero though of unknown authorship) – the first record of the "loci method", or architectural mnemonic. This technique relies on our inherently strong visual and spatial memory (see theory of natural selection for reasons why we didn't need to remember phone numbers but most definitely needed to remember locations of food, resources, shelter and a route home) and even boasts its own creation myth which is worth recounting here in brief. Supposedly, the poet Simonides of Ceos was the sole survivor when a dining-hall collapsed sometime in the fifth century BCE. He was asked to record who was buried beneath the rubble and when he closed his eyes to reconstruct the crumbled building in his imagination, he had an extraordinary realisation: he could remember exactly where each of the guests at the tragic meal had been sitting. Even though he had made no conscious effort to memorise the layout of the room, it had nonetheless impressed itself on his mind. Simonides recognised that if, instead of guests sitting about a banquet table, every great Greek dramatist had been seated in order of birth — he would have remembered them instead. He proposed that just about anything could be imprinted upon our minds, and kept in good order, simply by constructing a building in the imagination and filling it with imagery of what needed to be recalled. This imagined edifice could then be walked through at any time in the future and its contents would act as triggers.
The concept has cropped up time and time again in popular culture, from such varied sources as Hannibal to Sherlock Holmes, and has been known by several different names; whether memory palace, mind attic et cetera...
The art of memory is a lost one, and one in dire need of a revival. Secret societies like KL7 (oops - just gave that one away!) treat it as a sub rosa skill of which they are the protectors. In truth, we all have the potential (a ~10TB human brain - sorry if you're not) to remember vast quantities of information. All we need is a bit of practice - methods to make accurate memory a habit... and luckily there are a veritable plethora of them! Usually associated with training in logic and rhetoric, mnemotechnics have been around since the first millennium BCE, with early texts by authors such as Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. However, the one text from which we have gleaned the most is Rhetorica ad Herrenium (here credited to Cicero though of unknown authorship) – the first record of the "loci method", or architectural mnemonic. This technique relies on our inherently strong visual and spatial memory (see theory of natural selection for reasons why we didn't need to remember phone numbers but most definitely needed to remember locations of food, resources, shelter and a route home) and even boasts its own creation myth which is worth recounting here in brief. Supposedly, the poet Simonides of Ceos was the sole survivor when a dining-hall collapsed sometime in the fifth century BCE. He was asked to record who was buried beneath the rubble and when he closed his eyes to reconstruct the crumbled building in his imagination, he had an extraordinary realisation: he could remember exactly where each of the guests at the tragic meal had been sitting. Even though he had made no conscious effort to memorise the layout of the room, it had nonetheless impressed itself on his mind. Simonides recognised that if, instead of guests sitting about a banquet table, every great Greek dramatist had been seated in order of birth — he would have remembered them instead. He proposed that just about anything could be imprinted upon our minds, and kept in good order, simply by constructing a building in the imagination and filling it with imagery of what needed to be recalled. This imagined edifice could then be walked through at any time in the future and its contents would act as triggers.
The concept has cropped up time and time again in popular culture, from such varied sources as Hannibal to Sherlock Holmes, and has been known by several different names; whether memory palace, mind attic et cetera...
The Method of Loci may use an aedificium as described above, or may be a well-known route that you walk to your local station, supermarket or, god(s) forbid, church. Whatever space you use, you'll need to reinforce your memory of it by visualising it whenever you get the chance. You also need "pegs" or distinguishing features of that locus and, of course, a ton of data you want to memorise - whether that be the poems of Walter de la Mare, the capitols of every country in the world or indeed your Chopin Liszt. It is time to firstly find an order for these items (this is vital - if it's a phone number it's obvious!), and then relate them to your pegs using strong visual links. For more detailed instruction see the texts linked above or read up on the methods utilised by memory "champions". I employed quotation marks there not because I lack respect for such dedicated practitioners but because I didn't want to give the impression that they were in any way special – anyone can improve their memory with a little effort!
I would recommend having a sprawling "palace" for those memories you want to remember permanently, with many wings, corridors and rooms to categorise different subjects (so you may have a poetry wing with a room for each poem) and a short sojourn around your house or somewhere you know very well to act as your slate to remember things in a more temporary fashion (with bizarre images of your groceries doing unspeakable things in the kitchen). Personally, I have opted for the British Museum for the former as I am familiar with it but don't go as often as I used to so my images are not in danger of being scrambled. This can also act as a visualisation of one's mind at work and I particularly enjoy the open 'reading room' as my mapping of conscious thought. It enables meditation at a moment's notice and indeed, such spatial techniques are used by those seeking to focus their minds in this way.
As a last word, I would like to recommend another book, namely Mastermind by psychologist Maria Konnikova. It is a very informative read and will enlighten you to the great number of experiments that go on involving memory skills and those parts of the brain that contribute most significantly spatial learning: the medial parietal cortex, retrosplenial cortex, and the right posterior hippocampus. Also, as is to be expected there are several practical step-by-step guides on Lifehacker for anyone who's interested.
Friday, 8 February 2013
Wednesday, 6 February 2013
The Sheepstealers / The Brisk Lad / All I Have Is My Own
This is an ol' folk song from Dorset that I've just learnt. It condones thievery - proper folksy! The harmonies are a bit rough but oh well. Enjoy! x
Saturday, 26 January 2013
Books To Read Before You Live
Okay. So this is clearly inspired by those posts which appear everyday on Amazon, the Guardian and every other site in the blogosphere. They are usually lists made up of classic novels and self-help philosophies to read before you die, but I would like to break with tradition in giving you a few recommendations of books which may have a dramatic impact on the course of your life, help you live better, or just generally enrich your experience of the world around you. Obviously, classics are classic for a reason but I will try not to pick those books which you already know the names of, and hopefully give you some new titles to hunt down. So without further ado, first up...
How to Live: A Life of Montaigne (by Sarah Bakewell)
This delightful blend of literary criticism, biography, and practical self-improvment lends itself perfectly to the task of analysing the vast literary canon of Michel Eyquem de Montaigne, the French nobleman who inspired such strong opinions from all who came after him; whether they be 17th century Libertines, Enlightenment philosophers, Romantics or 19th century Moralists. Using his Essais, Bakewell addresses the topics of birth, death, and everything in between, not only painting a picture of an extraordinary man, but passing on his fabulous nuggets of wisdom.
Free Will (by Sam Harris)
From the author of The End of Faith, this slim volume of about 90 pages will set you back £3.50 on Amazon. Seriously, skip your next chai latte (no matter how perfect) and buy this instead. As should be obvious from the title, this book deals with the subject of "free will", a subject which affects the majority of what we value as humans. "It is difficult to think about law, politics, religion, public policy, intimate relationships, morality—as well as feelings of remorse or personal achievement—without first imagining that every person is the true source of his or her thoughts and actions." And indeed, Sam Harris debunks this belief (as he is wont to do) and reasons that it is an inherently flawed and incoherent concept, even in subjective terms. The outcome is a powerful and provocative read which could radically change the way we view ourselves as humans. His argument doesn't count on you being an atheist but does require you to possess a faculty of reason (and I find that the two are rarely found together). Anyway, the point being: no matter who you are, what you believe, how you've been educated et cetera... you should read this book!
The Stranger (by Albert Camus)
I realise that this may be a name you know well and is even hailed as a classic on those lists I am attempting to supersede, but it is usually placed very low down and underrated. This novel will change your view of life. In true existentialist style, Camus' protagonist questions the meaning (or lack of) in life; what it means to be human; and the role of judgement, defence, forgiveness, and despair. The use of hyperbole, understatement and metaphor in the writing allows for splendid elasticity of interpretation; encouraging you impose your own inner landscape onto the seemingly uniform outside world and leaving room for personal interpretations of the subtext. Without knowing you I cannot predict how you will react to this novel, but personally, I ended up weeping my way through the first half before turning the last page with a smile of awe.
How Proust Can Change Your Life (by Alain de Botton)
Again, a perfect mix of literary criticism and self-assessment philosophy, this exploration of the life and masterpiece of Marcel Proust could well "change your life". Whether or not you have read the longest novel in existence, À la recherche du temps perdu, you will want to by the time you have finished this inspiring work of modern philosopher and journalist, Alain de Botton. I would also like to recommend his other works; The Consolations of Philosophy and The Art of Travel.
How to Live: A Life of Montaigne (by Sarah Bakewell)
This delightful blend of literary criticism, biography, and practical self-improvment lends itself perfectly to the task of analysing the vast literary canon of Michel Eyquem de Montaigne, the French nobleman who inspired such strong opinions from all who came after him; whether they be 17th century Libertines, Enlightenment philosophers, Romantics or 19th century Moralists. Using his Essais, Bakewell addresses the topics of birth, death, and everything in between, not only painting a picture of an extraordinary man, but passing on his fabulous nuggets of wisdom.
Free Will (by Sam Harris)
From the author of The End of Faith, this slim volume of about 90 pages will set you back £3.50 on Amazon. Seriously, skip your next chai latte (no matter how perfect) and buy this instead. As should be obvious from the title, this book deals with the subject of "free will", a subject which affects the majority of what we value as humans. "It is difficult to think about law, politics, religion, public policy, intimate relationships, morality—as well as feelings of remorse or personal achievement—without first imagining that every person is the true source of his or her thoughts and actions." And indeed, Sam Harris debunks this belief (as he is wont to do) and reasons that it is an inherently flawed and incoherent concept, even in subjective terms. The outcome is a powerful and provocative read which could radically change the way we view ourselves as humans. His argument doesn't count on you being an atheist but does require you to possess a faculty of reason (and I find that the two are rarely found together). Anyway, the point being: no matter who you are, what you believe, how you've been educated et cetera... you should read this book!
The Stranger (by Albert Camus)
I realise that this may be a name you know well and is even hailed as a classic on those lists I am attempting to supersede, but it is usually placed very low down and underrated. This novel will change your view of life. In true existentialist style, Camus' protagonist questions the meaning (or lack of) in life; what it means to be human; and the role of judgement, defence, forgiveness, and despair. The use of hyperbole, understatement and metaphor in the writing allows for splendid elasticity of interpretation; encouraging you impose your own inner landscape onto the seemingly uniform outside world and leaving room for personal interpretations of the subtext. Without knowing you I cannot predict how you will react to this novel, but personally, I ended up weeping my way through the first half before turning the last page with a smile of awe.
How Proust Can Change Your Life (by Alain de Botton)
Again, a perfect mix of literary criticism and self-assessment philosophy, this exploration of the life and masterpiece of Marcel Proust could well "change your life". Whether or not you have read the longest novel in existence, À la recherche du temps perdu, you will want to by the time you have finished this inspiring work of modern philosopher and journalist, Alain de Botton. I would also like to recommend his other works; The Consolations of Philosophy and The Art of Travel.
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